It is my contention argued in my book, *The Utility of Force*, that the nature of our operations today and in the future are fundamentally of a different nature to those of the past and for which our institutions have developed to conduct successfully. I call this form or model of war, War Amongst the People, in contrast to the past Industrial Wars. The essential difference is that military force is no longer used to decide the matter but to create a condition in which the strategic result is achieved by other means; the strategic object being to alter the opponent's intentions rather than to destroy him. As a result we do not move in the linear process of Peace—Crisis—War—Resolution—Peace, that our institutions have evolved to manage to advantage. Now we are in a world of continual Confrontations and Conflicts in which the military acts in the Conflict support the achievement of the desired outcome to the Confrontation by other means; such as diplomatic, economic, political, and legal measures.

When I talk of Institutions I am referring to institutions of governance whether they be those of Washington DC, Whitehall, or any other capital, whether they be parliamentary or administrative, and whether they are national or intergovernmental. I refer also to the executive institutions, the diplomatic, intelligence, armed and development services, and the multinational organizations we form from them. And I refer to the institutional relationships, process, and authorities that link them into a whole. I am not, except in general terms, referring to particular equipments or capabilities. It is the way we think about war and conflict and how the institutions work together that has to change. To help understand the magnitude of the change in thinking required, consider the Realists and Impressionists.

Now I said that we were now in a world of Confrontations and Conflicts and I will explain what I mean by those words; I do not use them as synonyms. A Confrontation occurs when two or more bodies in broadly the same circumstances are pursuing different outcomes. Political affairs of all stripes, national and international, are about resolving confrontations. There are two types of confrontations: collaborative and conflictual.

When the parties are resolved to work together or to abide by some rules or law, we have what I call collaborative confrontations. Alliances such as NATO or coalitions such as that in Iraq are examples of collaborative confrontations, these are strategic and formal, but you can have others at Theatre level, such as that in Iraq between the Coalition and the Iraqi Security Forces. It is

important to note that the parties do not have the same outcomes or interests in mind; each member of an alliance has its own national reasons and interests for collaborating and these differences define the collaborative confrontation.

But when one or both sides cannot get their way in the confrontation and will not accept an alternative outcome, they sometimes seek to use military force to get it – they turn to Conflict. When this occurs with Industrial War we resort to resolve the matter by conflict; war was decisive strategically.

However, today in adopting Conflict as the course of action the side that is weak, if it is wise, does not play to the opponent's strengths, but rather follows the path of: avoiding set battle, except on his own terms, and the operationally or strategically decisive engagement, so as not to present the opponent with opportunities to strike the mortal blows. He follows a generic strategy composed of the "Propaganda of the Deed," the "Strategy of Provocation," and the "Erosion of Will." In broad terms these strategic strands are intended to dislocate the opponent's military actions from their political purpose so as to gain advantage in the overall Confrontation. Or else the weak seeks to replicate the strong, and like North Korea and others develop nuclear weapons, while following the same generic strategy.

Now if you are very strong and have nuclear weapons you have too much to lose in using them. But whether you have them or not you have to find a way to exert power, to use your strength which should not be measured by the size of ones military forces; for as the philosopher Michel Foucalt said, "power is a relationship not a possession." Finding the way to establish that relationship to advantage is the strategic question of our time. How and to what end do we apply force sub-strategically in the Conflict so as to gain our strategic and political position in the overall Confrontation. Or how do you gain the outcome you desire in a War Amongst the People.

War Amongst the People has six characteristics or trends. I call them trends because in each case their significance is different and they are in a different balance. Indeed, although I list them they should be understood as being in a circle; each influencing the others. The six trends are:

- Ends or strategic objectives are changing from the hard simple objectives of industrial war to soft or malleable conditional objectives
- Non-state and multinational actors are involved
- Amongst the People
  - Literally
  - Media
- Timeless—Confrontation is unresolved by the conflict

- ➤ Fight not to lose the force
- ➤ New use for old weapons and organizations.

  I will take each of these in turn.
- ➤ The Ends: In Industrial War the opponents sought to resolve the political confrontation that was its cause directly by military force. The objectives for the use of military force in Industrial War are hard and simple: "Take, hold, destroy, and defeat." These are the sorts of words used. In War Amongst the People the objectives are malleable and complex, they describe a condition, which enables intentions to be changed or formed by other means, an example would be "create a safe and secure environment," because in War Amongst the People military force does not resolve the confrontation directly, the conflicts or forceful acts contribute to one or other sides efforts to win the confrontation. And the more we seek to establish law and order the more the will or intentions of the people become the objective.

  Here are some examples of these conditional objectives; I give this range of examples to show that this trend has existed for a long time:
    - The Korean War, where we changed our intentions when China intervened, because to do other wise was to use the atomic bomb: we therefore settled for the condition of a divided Korea on or about the line on which the conflict started. And we have had to maintain the condition ever since, because the confrontation within which the conflict nested is unresolved and may well now be nuclear.
    - The Yom Kippur War in 1973 when Sadat's objective was to create a condition by military force in which the confrontation between the Egyptians and Israelis could be resolved.
    - Bosnia, Kosovo, and now Afghanistan and Iraq all give examples, regardless of the rhetoric at the time, of the military being used to establish a condition, usually expressed as a safe and secure environment, rather than resolving the confrontation.
- ➤ The next trend is that we tend to carry out these actions in multi-national groupings or in non-state groupings. These coalitions are at root collaborative confrontations and need not be the formal ones like the NATO Alliance or the UN or the coalition in Iraq today, but are often particularly in the Theatre of Operations, informal, and include in effect other agencies, e.g. the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), non-governmental organizations (NGO's) such as the United Nations High Commissioner for

Refugees (UNHCR), OXFAM, or *Medecins Sans Frontieres* (MSF) (Doctors without Borders), and local actors such as the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan.

➢ The third and most obvious trend is that war takes place amongst the people. Firstly, the objective is the will of the people. Secondly, the opponent often operating to the tenets of the guerrilla and the terrorist depend on the people for concealment, for support both moral and physical, and for information. But these conflicts take place amongst the people in another sense, through the media. Whoever coined the phrase the Theatre of Operations was very prescient. We operate now as though we were in a Theatre or Roman Circus. The Theatre commander needs to produce a more compelling story than his opponent in the minds of the people, both those in the circus pit and in the stands. As an example of this consider: The conflict between Hezbollah and Israel this summer. It took place amongst the people in both of the senses that I use the phrase. In Israel the people and their houses towns and cities were manifestly the target of the rocket attacks, and Israel in attacking Hezbollah operating amongst the people hit Lebanese people and property. And in the Theatre who had the most compelling narrative? On balance and judging the majority view it is probably Hezbollah's. Who with disciplined silence and an uncommon lack of organizational ego played to the generic strategy: in the Propaganda of the Deed they were seen to stand up to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and have to be treated with; and with the Strategy of Provocation, particularly within in the context of the greater Confrontation, they were able to cast themselves as victims.

I emphasise these first three trends to highlight three consequences.

- The difficulty of analysis and explanation
- The difficulty of defining success or victory
- The problem of foreseeing the effect of a particular action in the conflict on these confrontations.
- The difficulty that groups in collaborative confrontations have in deciding on a strategy—witness the performance of the UN, or the G8.
- The application of the Law

➢ The fourth trend is that War Amongst the People is timeless. We set out to win Industrial Wars quickly, because the whole of society was involved and we wanted to get back to peace and have a normal life. In our new circumstances timing is more important than doing things to time. The basic tactic is to engage only on ones own terms, not today or on Tuesday, not when the opponent wants you to, but when it is to your advantage to do safely.

And when our military objectives are to set conditions in which other instruments of power resolve the confrontation then we must maintain the condition until they succeed. We are still in Korea and Cyprus maintaining the conditions or in Bosnia and Kosovo----The rhetoric at the time of the initial engagement, based on concepts of Industrial War, said otherwise but the reality is staring us in the face.

➤ The fifth trend is that we fight to preserve the force. No commander wants to suffer any more casualties to his men and equipment than he has to. But in Industrial War it was in the main possible to replace his losses, We developed the production lines to do this: conscription, the training depots and formations, and the reserves, in the case of humans and the industrial production lines together with the R&D organizations to provide the equipment. In large measure these production lines exist no longer. We are unable to replace our losses. We fight to preserve the force for other reasons. We have to sustain the operation, because it is not strategically decisive we have to maintain the condition, and to do that needs a continuous presence. And politicians at home uncertain of the peoples support for the venture wish to keep the costs to men and materiel within bounds that are politically sustainable in the circumstances.

➤ The sixth and final trend is that new uses are being found for weapons and organizations acquired and developed for different purposes. I am not arguing that commanders should not adapt their forces to the circumstances—indeed they should. But if we look at the use of the some of our weapons they are not being used for the purpose or in the way they were intended to be. If we are not using these equipments for the purpose and in the way we had intended something must have changed. What is happening is that our opponents are operating below the threshold of the utility of our forces as we intended to use them.

Please note that in spelling out these characteristics I have not said there will not be big fights or that he future was one of urban terrorism. Indeed the example of the recent conflict in Lebanon; a conflict nested within a complex and long running confrontation, gives evidence of the intensity and the magnitude of the fighting. Nor have I said that that these fights will not be in support of the achievement of objectives to do with state sovereignty. I am saying that force will not achieve this directly or strategically, it may, if used well, establish a condition in which the objective is achieved by other means.

These trends when taken together lead to the following amongst others:

➤ The difficulty of analysis and explanation—the situation is complex

➤ The difficulty in deciding on the military objectives that affect the intentions of the opponent

- The difficulty when taking military action of avoiding driving the people amongst which we fight into his arms
- The problem of foreseeing the effect of a particular action in the Conflict on these Confrontations.
- The difficulty in defining what constitutes success
- The difficulty that these groups in collaborative Confrontations have in deciding on a strategy
- The application of the Law—which is state based, whether it is treaty law or International Humanitarian Law (IHL).
- The difficulty in sustaining the operation.

To conclude—what is to be done? The single most important thing to change is the way we think about the use of military force. To recognize the change in paradigm and that our institutional mindsets, developed and honed during years of Industrial War, need to change to recognize that the ultimate objective in War Amongst the People is to capture the minds of the people.

Force has utility. If it does not, why are we so concerned about terrorist groups, the spread of nuclear weapons, warlords, ethnic cleansing, or is it genocide, in Darfur and elsewhere? Why is it that our opponents appear to understand the utility of force rather better than we do? How do we bring our military force to bear to advantage?

I have not said the future is one of urban terrorism or there will not be big fights. Indeed the examples of last year on the Israel/Lebanese border were big battles or were not the stuff of urban terrorism. Nor have I said that that these fights will not be in support of the achievement of objectives to do with state sovereignty. I am saying that force will not achieve this directly or strategically, it may, if used well, establish a condition in which the objective is achieved by other means. We need to find a way to bring these other means to bear at the appropriate time and place in conjunction with the use of military force.

Force must be used in conjunction with other means so as to defeat our enemies and gain advantage in the confrontation. Each fight won must contribute to achieving, however indirectly, the Confrontational goal. Winning a Conflict or fight without being able to exploit the result to advantage is an operational or strategic error which if repeated can lead to the phenomena of winning every engagement and losing the war, like the Rhodesians in the 1970's or the USA in Vietnam.

We need to operate so that: the logical linkage between our desired outcome and our actions is strong and secure; we dictate the narrative; and we dislocate our opponent's actions from his objective. We must recognize that information is the currency of these engagements, and while

firepower is the currency of the battle, battles must be chosen and conducted for the information we gain and they transmit to our advantage.

We need to understand the nature of the Confrontation and the outcome we want adopted. To do this we need information. We must operate to learn. We must operate to gain the information to: uncover, to force the opponent to expose himself and his intentions and to show the difference between himself and the people. Much of this information is available. He lives amongst the people, and information can be collected by all who interact with the people. Until we have the information we cannot decide on the right mix of force and other means, or the deployment and employment of the force and other means. Of course we must start with some mix but we must operate to improve it in relationship with and to the disadvantage of the opponent.

Until we have this information we cannot isolate the enemy from the people, we cannot be sure of our targets, we are reactive or lack the initiative. And until we have this information we cannot enforce the law, whether it be treaty, humanitarian or criminal law, and until the law is in force we cannot remove the military.

We must put information out. We must capture the narrative. We must understand the Theatre of Operations as a theatre and the Theatre Commander or Director, for he need not and probably should not be a military commander, must be setting out in his campaign to write a more compelling script than his opponent. We must explain ourselves to the people in the theatre and those at home and in parliament.

I do not think our national institutions are capable of what I have described and we are surely not capable of doing this internationally. Yet we are acting multinationally against opponents that are more often than not, not states or acting as states. Until we recognize the shift from the model of Industrial War to that of War Amongst the People and think about the use of military force accordingly we will not change our institutions so as to be able to achieve our purpose in the Confrontation in which the Conflict nests.

General Sir Rupert Smith
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